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Introduction
Corruption and its potential reduction is a con-
stant topic not only of economic or social scien-
ce research, but also an issue that plagues go-
vernments and citizens alike. This phenomenon 
is more or less immanent in every social system, 
regardless of the size and sophistication of the 
country or culture of the nation. Despite the fact 
that corruption is not a new phenomenon and 
a number of foreign and domestic authors have 
been dealing with this subject for several years, 
there are still many questions that remain unan-
swered. The very defi nition of the term corrupti-
on is not yet clear, and different authors defi ne 
corruption with greater or smaller differences. 
For more detail, see e.g. [6], [9], [29], [20]. Even 
the question of whether and how corruption can 
affect the economic level of a country has never 
been answered by any literature without con-
troversy. One may thus encounter the view that 
corruption is “sand in the wheels” of the eco-
nomy, which impedes economic transactions, 
as it reduces the security of property rights and 
contributes to ineffi cient allocation of resources 
[23], [28], [24], [17], [13]. On the other hand, 
there are authors who believe that corruption is 
precisely what “greases the wheels” of the eco-
nomy, because it allows individuals to avoid ad-
ministrative and bureaucratic delays [12], [14], 
[15], [1], [16]. It can be said, however, that with 
the existence of adequate legislation, the argu-
ment about corruption as “greasing the wheels 
of the economy” is totally unacceptable.
The issue of quantifying the degree of 
corruption also raises fi erce debate. Consi-
dering the fact that bribery and other forms 
of corruption are illegal in most countries, the 
people involved make every effort to carefully 
conceal their actions and revealing corruption 
is often almost impossible. Even so, there are 
currently a number of exact procedures that 
attempt to quantify the level of corruption in 
a country. Among the best known current in-
dicators of corruption is one example, the CPI 
(Corruption Perception Index), published an-
nually by Transparency International and the 
Control of Corruption of the World Bank [27]. 
A common feature of all currently existing indi-
ces of corruption, however, is the fact that all 
without exception quantify the level of corrupti-
on in a country and are therefore not applicable 
for quantifi cation of corruption at a sub-national 
level. The authors of this paper argue that the 
socio-economic development in a country is not 
homogeneous, and that it can be assumed that 
a difference exists in the extent of corruption in 
different regions within the same country. Under 
this assumption, more corrupt sub-national re-
gions are detrimental to the national evaluation 
of corruption in a country as a whole. The fact 
that the distribution of corruption in a country is 
not homogenous was confi rmed by authors [2] 
and [5] in their studies of Italian regions. The le-
vel of corruption in the sub national breakdown 
as reported by these authors was very diverse 
and its analysis can help explain the differen-
ces in the different economic performance of 
the regions. It can be noted, however, that the 
study of the Italian authors is unique and fi nding 
another study on the quantifi cation of regional 
levels of corruption, or its impact on the regi-
on, is virtually impossible. From this it is clear 
that the issue of quantifying corruption and its 
consequences at the regional level is a topic 
that deserves more attention. There are several 
reasons to consider these issues. Perhaps the 
strongest is that if corruption is indeed one of 
the variables that are degrading the performan-
ce of economies, the elimination of corruption in 
certain regions may just be the key to removing 
regional economic disparities and thereby incre-
asing the economic performance of the country. 
Analysing regional corruption may also lead to 
the creation of direct regional anti-corruption 
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initiatives that can bring about reductions in the 
national level of corruption. In general terms, 
a sub-national resolution in terms of the degree 
of corruption could bring a new dimension to 
traditional theories of regional disparities.
The main objective of this article is formula-
ted in the context of the above considerations. 
It contains a design for a method of quantifying 
the extent of corruption at the level of regional 
cohesion. The proposed method is then verifi ed 
and applied to individual regions of the Member 
States and candidate States of the European 
Union. Using the proposed method it is possible 
to evaluate the current state of corruption in the 
evaluated regions, to mutually compare the re-
gions, to determine the degree of deviation from 
the “surface” level of national corruption and si-
multaneously determine the degree of variabili-
ty in the extent of corruption within the country.
The text of this article presents the propo-
sed method of quantifying the regional level of 
corruption verifi ed using Kendall’s coeffi cient 
of concordance for further use. Verifi cation of 
the proposed method is carried out at a natio-
nal and regional level. Methods at the national 
level are verifi ed by comparing the evaluation 
of the newly proposed method to the evaluation 
of existing corruption indices. This will determi-
ne the level of agreement between the already 
established indices and the newly proposed 
method. The methods are verifi ed at the regi-
onal level using police statistics on recorded 
corruption offences. After the method is verifi ed, 
the level of corruption in the various regions is 
calculated. Special attention is paid to quanti-
fying the extent of corruption in the regions of 
the Czech Republic. Calculating the level of 
corruption in the Czech regions will identify tho-
se regions which are more affected by corrupti-
on than others and would thus worsen the nati-
onal evaluation of the Czech Republic within the 
standard published indices of corruption.
1.  Proposal for a Method of 
Quantifying the Extent of 
Corruption at a Sub-National Level
Due to the absence of any method for deter-
mining corruption in a more or less affected 
sub-national region, the next section will pre-
sent a method for quantifying corruption at 
a sub-national level. The design of this method 
is based on the construction of the European 
Quality of Government Index developed by the 
European Commission together with The Qua-
lity of Government Institute. Corruption is unde-
rstood here in accordance with the defi nition of 
Nye, who describes corruption as “behaviour 
that deviates from the formal duties of a pub-
lic role because of private-regarding wealth or 
status gains“ [20]. This defi nition focuses on the 
abuse of public power, and somewhat ignores 
corruption in the private sector, which of cour-
se also exists. Most existing studies, however, 
have focused on corruption in the public sector, 
as the consequences of misuse of public power 
impact the broad mass of taxpayers and the 
country as such.
1.1 The European Quality of 
Government Index
The European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI) was created to quantify the quality of pu-
blic administration at a regional level. The index 
so far been developed twice; in 2010 and 2013. 
27 EU Member States were included in the EQI 
in 2010. In 2013, 28 EU Member States are in-
cluded as well as the Candidate States Turkey 
and Serbia; in total 30 countries. The European 
Commission plans to construct EQI regularly 
every three years.
In addition to the national evaluation of the 
quality of governance, the resulting EQI also 
takes note of the evaluation of regional admini-
stration using regional data which the Europe-
an Commission has drawn up for the needs of 
constructing the EQI. The EQI thus consists of 
two main parts:
The fi rst part of the EQI takes into ac-
count the national government level, which 
is represented by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. Of the six 
pillars of the quality of governance, the Europe-
an Commission chose four for the construction 
of the EQI: Voice and Accountability (GM1), 
Government Effectiveness (GM3), Rule of Law 
(GM5) Control of Corruption (GM6) [4], [26], 
[11].
The second part of the EQI, which takes 
into account the regional level of governan-
ce, was compiled by the European Commission 
on the basis of a unique regional survey, condu-
cted for the sole purpose of creating a Regional 
indicator of government quality, which would 
take into account regional aspects in the fi nal 
construction of the EQI.
This unique research registered in the fi rst 
construction of the EQI was executed in 172 
NUTS II regions in 18 countries of the Eu-
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ropean Union in 2010 (from the remaining 9 
countries of the European Union only data at 
the national level was included). The research 
includes altogether 181 regional units. Data 
was obtained by means of surveying more than 
33,000 inhabitants. The all-European regional 
research was conducted from 15th December 
2009 to 1st February 2010 by means of telepho-
ne interviews with respondents older than 18 
years and in the local language. 
In the second construction of EQI, it was 
executed in 206 NUTS regions in 24 count-
ries of the European Union in 2013 (from the 
remaining 7 countries of the European Union 
only data at the national level was included). 
The research includes altogether 213 regional 
units. Data was obtained by means of research 
of more than 85,000 inhabitants.
The resulting regional quality of adminis-
tration indicator refl ects the actual experience 
of respondents with the use of individual pub-
lic services, thus the quality of governance in 
the region is evaluated as it is perceived by its 
inhabitants; i.e., the recipients of public admin-
istration. The Regional indicator of government 
quality is composed of 16 separate indicators 
relating to the quality of administration in a par-
ticular region. These 16 indicators were devel-
oped based on 16 questions (The list of ques-
tions is available at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/
data/datadownloads/qogeuregionaldata/.) de-
veloped in accordance with the pillars arising 
from the methodology of the WGI: Voice and 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule 
of Law and Control of Corruption. In order to 
capture the most important sub-national differ-
ences, questions were focused on three public 
services that are often funded or administered 
at sub-national levels. Each of the four pillars 
mentioned thus involves issues relating to edu-
cation, health care and law enforcement in the 
region. With a focus on these three services, 
respondents were asked to assess these public 
services with regard to the three fundamental 
concepts of quality administration - quality, im-
partiality and corruption. These three concepts 
are the pillars of the resulting regional indicator 
of quality government. Data is aggregated three 
times using a simple average. First is the cre-
ation of the average values of responses to the 
questions. This will create 16 indicators for each 
region. Then these 16 values are aggregated 
into three defi ned pillars - quality, impartiality 
and corruption. Finally, these three pillars are 
aggregated into a single numerical Regional 
quality of administration indicator. A simple dia-
gram of the formation of the Regional indicator 
of government quality is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Approach to creating a Regional Indicator of Government Quality
Source: own work according to [3]
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Thus in its fi nal form, the resulting EU Quality 
of Government Index enriches the national 
evaluation of quality of administration created 
by the World Bank (WGI) on a regional scale 
(Regional indicator of government quality). 
The fi nal form of the construction of the EQI 
is as follows:
EQIregionXincountryY = WGIcountryY + 
+ (RqogregionXincountryY – CRqogcountryY ), (1)
where EQIregionXincountryY is the fi nal European 
Quality of Government Index in the region of 
a given country, 
WGIcountryY is the national average of the 
above four Worldwide Governance Indicators 
for each country, 
RqogregionXincountryY is the score from a regional 
survey; thus the Regional indicator of 
government quality,
CRqogcountryY is the regional survey of 
all regions in the country weighted by the 
proportion of the population of each region to 
the national population of the country.
The EQI has so far been calculated twice; 
once in 2010 and in 2013. Member States of 
the EU-28, Turkey and Serbia, were included in 
the calculation.
1.2 Proposal for a Regional Index of 
Corruption
It is apparent that the resulting EQI, as it was 
compiled by the European Commission together 
with The Quality of Government Institute, provi-
des the opportunity to pursue a quantifi cation of 
corruption at a sub-national level, which had not 
previously been practically possible. The pri-
mary modifi cations of the already created EQI 
can create a modifi ed index, which, of all the 
components of quality government, takes into 
account only corruption; it therefore takes into 
account only the indicator Control of Corrupti-
on in the national evaluation and the indicator 
Pillars of Corruption in the regional evaluation. 
Based on this modifi ed methodology of the EQI 
composition, the modifi ed method of calculating 
EQI can then be applied only for the purpose of 
quantifying corruption in the cohesion regions.
The resulting Regional Index of Corruption 
(RIC) is then calculated based on the formula:
RICregionXincountryY = CCcountryY + 
+ (PCqogregionXincountryY – CPCqogcountryY ), (2)
where RICregionXincountryY is the resulting 
Regional Index of Corruption for each region of 
a given country, 
CCcountryY is the national indicator value 
of Control Of Corruption (GM6) from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
PCqogregionXincountryY is the score from a regional 
survey focused on corruption, thus Pillar of 
Corruption,
CPCqogcountryY is the value for the Pillar of 
Corruption from the regional survey of all 
regions in a country weighted by the proportion 
of the population in each region on the national 
population of the country.
Composite indicators often evoke a number 
of questions relating to their composition and 
weighting of the individual indicators entering 
into a composite indicator. There were created 
tens of aggregated indicators at the time when 
composite indicators reached a rapid expansion. 
Most of them, unfortunately, were not built on 
correct statistical basis [25]. Because of these 
errors composite indicators failed to meet 
expectations, which were inserted into them, 
sparking concerns among their users and 
negatively affected trust in composite indicators 
in general. The credibility of these indicators is 
mainly related to the accuracy of data, based on 
which they are constructed and the methodology 
by which they are constructed. Number of 
composite indicators is constructed by reputable 
international institution. Such indicators can get 
known and respected easier and earlier. However, 
although composite indicators are designed 
very carefully and statistical requirements have 
been met, their acceptation is always dependent 
on bargaining and how they are accepted by 
experts and public. Acceptation of aggregated 
indicators mostly depends on how they meet 
the original goal, i.e. whether measure what they 
should and the subsequent acceptance of their 
users. Gaining legitimacy and trust of users is 
a gradual process.
In the case of constructing indicator EQI was 
by the European Commission used an equal 
weighting of entering variables. With respect to 
author´s proposed RIC is a modifi cation of EQI, 
authors of the article do not consider important 
further weighting of variables entering into RIC.
2. Applying the Proposed Regional 
Index of Corruption
The Regional Index of Corruption (hereinafter 
RIC) is applied and tested fi rst at the national 
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level, then at the level of the cohesion regions. 
From the resulting values, the individual regions 
can be mutually compared and regions can be 
identifi ed which are more or less affected by 
corruption. Table 1 shows the resulting ranking of 
countries in the newly created RIC for the years 
2010 and 2013. Countries in the segmented EQI 
2013 are included; thus there are a total of 30 
countries. The higher the value of the RIC, the 
better is the evaluation of the country’s RIC. In the 
evaluation of the RIC between 2010 and 2013, 
it was found that the new Member States and 
candidate States of the European Union are at 
the very bottom of the list of countries evaluated. 
Conversely, the Nordic countries were evaluated 
as the least affected by corruption.
NUTS I RIC 2010 Ranking NUTS I RIC 2013 Ranking
DK 1.811919 1 DK 1.841393 1
FI 1.740486 2 SE 1.559288 2
SE 1.516722 3 FI 1.555572 3
NL 1.438868 4 LU 1.493145 4
LU 1.261475 5 NL 1.479409 5
AT 1.142543 6 DE 0.932501 6
IE 0.948732 7 UK 0.779821 7
DE 0.917613 8 BE 0.749709 8
UK 0.830591 9 IE 0.726454 9
FR 0.488344 10 FR 0.703595 10
BE 0.415918 11 AT 0.609217 11
CY 0.322032 12 PT 0.168304 12
ES 0.157165 13 ES 0.131936 13
MT 0.083101 14 EE -0.0212 14
PT 0.029269 15 SI -0.05617 15
SI -0.07815 16 CY -0.07266 16
EE -0.12856 17 MT -0.1372 17
LV -0.67118 18 PL -0.56423 18
LT -0.70428 19 HU -0.76712 19
HU -0.71697 20 CZ -0.7947 20
PL -0.76271 21 SK -0.85981 21
SK -0.81496 22 LT -0.86415 22
CZ -0.85541 23 LV -0.92744 23
IT -0.87991 24 IT -1.05754 24
GR -1.06275 25 TR -1.08985 25
TR -1.08395 26 HR -1.14626 26
HR -1.23592 27 GR -1.38318 27
RO -1.37328 28 RO -1.39001 28
RS -1.55004 29 BG -1.43259 29
BG -1.55089 30 RS -1.46287 30
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 1: Regional Index of Corruption for 2010 and 2013
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By using Statistica 12, graphic models 
were created of the variability of RIC values 
in individual countries for the years 2010 and 
2013. The box plots use the method of min-max 
comparison and show the range of RIC values 
marking the best and the worst of the regions 
evaluated in the country. On the x-axis are 
plotted the countries evaluated; on the y-axis 
are the resulting values of the RIC in a given 
year. The range of values is complemented by 
the fi nal value of the RIC of the country, which 
is represented by an asterisk. Figure 2 shows 
the range of RIC values for 2010 in the thirty 
countries evaluated. Defi nitely the greatest 
variability in the assessment of corruption is to be 
found in the Italian regions. Italian respondents 
answered questions regarding the impact of 
corruption on their area with great differences, 
and perceived corruption very differently 
depending on which region they live. The most 
corrupt Italian region, based on the results of 
the RIC from 2010, is the Campania region 
(ITF3), while the best ratings were achieved 
in the Umbria region (ITE2). A high variability 
was also observed in Romania, France and the 
Netherlands. Rating corruption at the national 
level can be particularly misleading for these 
countries. In the Czech Republic, a middle 
variability of RIC values was recorded. The top 
rated region is Jihozápad (Southwest) (CZ03) 
with a value of -0.9346 and the worst rating is 
the capital city of Prague (CZ01) with a value 
of -1.9878.
In the evaluation of RIC in 2010, the NUTS II 
regions which placed best were the Dutch region 
of Groningen (NL11) with a value of 2.8867. The 
best ratings in 2010 were achieved generally by 
Dutch, Danish, Finnish and Swedish regions. In 
contrast, at the other end of the ranking were 
Romanian, Italian and Bulgarian regions. 
Defi nitely the worst ranking among the 
NUTS II regions was the Romanian region of 
Bucharest (RO32) with a value of -2.7491.
Fig. 2: Box Graph of Values for the Regional Index of Corruption for 2010
Source: Author’s own work
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Figure 3 shows the range of values of RIC 
for 2013. In 2013, the region with the lowest 
level of corruption was the Finnish region of 
Aland (FI20) with a value of 2.3932. On the 
other hand, the most corrupt region of the 
European Union was the Bulgarian region of 
Yugozapaden (BG41) with a value of -2.5237. 
A high variability of data in 2013 was found 
again in Italy, as well as Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Romania. In these countries, the inhabitants 
of regions had different opinions on the impact 
of corruption in their area and the corruption 
assessment may not refl ect the current 
situation in some regions. In contrast, in Danish, 
Swedish, Irish and Croatian regions only very 
small deviations, were detected in the values of 
RIC of 2013 and evaluation of the national level 
of corruption relevantly refl ects the evaluation 
of the regions. Within the Czech Republic, 
in 2013 the best region evaluated in terms of 
corruption was Jihozápad (Southwest) (CZ03) 
with a value of -0.5694 and the most corrupt 
region was Severozápad (Northwest) (CZ04) 
with a value of -1.2304.
The resulting RIC values demonstrate that 
some European Union countries show a very 
high degree of variability in the regional level 
of corruption. This confi rms the assumption 
that existing indices evaluating the national 
level of corruption can ultimately overestimate 
the regions more affected by corruption and 
underestimate the less corrupt. Defi nitely the 
greatest variability of the data evaluated in both 
years was demonstrated in the Italian regions. 
In Italy, as one of the smaller countries, several 
studies on corruption have been conducted in 
various Italian regions. The authors [2] and [5] 
in their studies agree that the variability of the 
degree of corruption in the Italian regions is 
very high and in this country there are regions 
with very high levels of corruption, but also 
regions with much lower levels of corruption. 
By applying the proposed Regional Corruption 
Index (RIC), not only were the conclusions of 
the authors confi rmed regarding the Italian 
regions, but this conclusion is demonstrated in 
the majority of countries surveyed.
Fig. 3: Box Graph of Values for the Regional Index of Corruption for 2013
Source: Author’s own work
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2.1 Verifying the Proposed Method
The proposed method of quantifying the 
degree of corruption at the regional level is 
subsequently verifi ed at national and regional 
level. Kendall’s coeffi cient of concordance can 
be used for mathematical verifi cation of the 
conformity of the assessment methods for 
the proposed RIC and existing indexes. This 
is a non-parametric method of mathematical 
statistics which is primarily used to assess the 
conformity of individual evaluators. The value of 
the coeffi cient varies between 0 (no agreement) 
and 1 (complete agreement) [10].
2.1.1 Verifying Method at the National 
Level
In order to compare evaluations at the national 
level, two presently existing indices are selected 
which measure the degree of corruption in 
the country. These are indices that focus 
exclusively on quantifying the national level of 
corruption. The selected corruption indicators 
are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 
Transparency International and the Control of 
Corruption (CC) of the World Bank [11], [27]. 
Given that data from the Regional government 
quality indicator, which was used for the 
construction of the RIC, has been collected 
among respondents since 2009 and the data 
of the World Bank to evaluate the situation at 
the national level was drawn upon in 2008, it 
is appropriate, in assessing conformity of the 
ratings, to take into account not only data for 
2010. To compare the resulting values of RIC 
for 2010, a time range of existing indices were 
selected for the years 2008–2010, which take 
into account the entire time period during which 
the data was collected for the RIC. To verify the 
agreement of the assessment of RIC for 2013, 
the time range 2011 to 2013 was chosen.
Table 2 presents the resulting calculation 
of Kendall’s coeffi cient of concordance ranking 
countries according to the RIC in 2010 and the 
CPI and CC from 2008 to 2010 and to the RIC 
2013 and the CPI and the CPI and CC from 2011 
to 2013 as evaluated by the program Statistica 
12. Kendall’s coeffi cient of concordance 
assessing the order of the selected indices 
reaches around 98%. The RIC itself with each 
of the chosen indices for each year corellates in 
all cases at least at a level of 95%.
High values of the coeffi cients of 
concordance in both years indicate that the 
proposed RIC ranks countries in terms of their 
corruption very similarly to the currently used 
indices of corruption. These conclusions of 
Kendall’s coeffi cient of concordance verify the 
possibility of using the RIC.
Variable
Kendall´s coeffi cient for RIC 2010 Kendall´s coeffi cient for RIC 2013
(no. of variables–30, no. of indices-7) (no. of variables–30, no. of indices-6)
Avg. value r = 0.97501 Avg. value r = 0.98355
Average 
(ranking)
Total 
(ranking)
Average Deviation
Average 
(ranking)
Total 
(ranking)
Average Deviation
AT 6.85714 48.0000 6.85714 0.89974 10.33333 62.0000 10.16667 1.602082
BE 10.28571 72.0000 10.28571 0.48795 8.08333 48.5000 8.00000 0.632456
BG 28.71429 201.0000 28.57143 1.13389 28.58333 171.5000 28.50000 0.836660
CY 13.57143 95.0000 13.42857 1.39728 13.66667 82.0000 13.66667 1.861899
CZ 20.50000 143.5000 20.42857 1.51186 21.25000 127.5000 21.00000 1.095445
DE 7.35714 51.5000 7.28571 0.95119 6.00000 36.0000 6.00000  
DK 1.14286 8.0000 1.00000  1.16667 7.0000 1.00000  
EE 14.71429 103.0000 14.57143 2.22539 13.33333 80.0000 13.33333 1.032796
ES 13.85714 97.0000 13.85714 0.89974 13.66667 82.0000 13.66667 1.211060
FI 2.42857 17.0000 2.28571 0.75593 2.41667 14.5000 2.16667 0.983192
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 2:
Kendall’s Coeffi cients of Concordance for Regional Index of Corruption 2010 
and 2013 – Part 1
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2.1.2  Verifying the Proposed Methods at 
the Regional Level
At present, virtually the only possible way to 
verify the proposed method at the regional level 
is to compare RIC with statistics of corruption 
offences in the regions of the Czech Republic. 
According to offi cial statistics of the Ministry of 
the Interior and the of the Czech National Police, 
however, only recorded cases of corruption 
can be traced, whose number is based on the 
activity of the state bodies. The strategy of the 
government in the fi ght against corruption for 
the period 2013–2014 indicates that corruption 
in the Czech Republic has a high degree 
of latency and only a few cases have been 
uncovered [18]. According to the Government 
Programme for Combating Corruption of the 
Czech Republic, only one percent of corruption 
offences have been uncovered [19]. The actual 
number of these crimes that have occurred in 
recent years is likely to be much higher [21]. 
For the purposes of distinguishing the regions 
on the basis of corruption, without the need for 
a precise quantifi cation, this tool is usable. 
In order to verify the Regional Corruption 
Index, the following corruption offences 
are used, related to corruption in public 
administration, which is defi ned by the Criminal 
Variable
Kendall´s coeffi cient for RIC 2010 Kendall´s coeffi cient for RIC 2013
(no. of variables–30, no. of indices-7) (no. of variables–30, no. of indices-6)
Avg. value r = 0.97501 Avg. value r = 0.98355
Average 
(ranking)
Total 
(ranking)
Average Deviation
Average 
(ranking)
Total 
(ranking)
Average Deviation
FR 10.71429 75.0000 10.71429 0.48795 10.00000 60.0000 10.00000 0.632456
GR 26.07143 182.5000 25.85714 2.03540 28.33333 170.0000 28.33333 1.366260
HR 26.42857 185.0000 26.42857 0.78679 25.08333 150.5000 24.83333 1.329160
HU 19.28571 135.0000 19.28571 1.11269 19.50000 117.0000 19.50000 0.547723
IE 6.85714 48.0000 6.71429 0.75593 9.33333 56.0000 9.16667 0.408248
IT 23.85714 167.0000 23.85714 1.57359 25.41667 152.5000 25.33333 1.211060
LT 21.78571 152.5000 21.57143 2.99205 19.91667 119.5000 19.83333 1.940790
LU 5,00000 35.0000 5.00000  4.66667 28.0000 4.66667 0.516398
LV 21.78571 152.5000 21.57143 1.90238 22.41667 134.5000 22.16667 0.983192
MT 16.00000 112.0000 16.00000 1.41421 17.16667 103.0000 17.16667 1.329160
NL 3.92857 27.5000 3.85714 0.37796 4.33333 26.0000 4.33333 0.516398
PL 19.71429 138.000 19.57143 2.22539 17.33333 104.0000 17.33333 1.211060
PT 14.57143 102.0000 14.57143 1.81265 14.00000 84.0000 14.00000 1.673320
RO 28.14286 197.0000 28.00000 0.81649 27.41667 164.5000 27.33333 1.211060
RS 29.64286 207.5000 29.57143 0.53452 29.41667 176.5000 29.33333 0.816497
SE 2.50000 17.5000 2.42857 0.78680 2.41667 14.5000 2.33333 0.516398
SI 14.28571 100.0000 14.14286 2.11570 16.08333 96.5000 16.00000 0.894427
SK 21.64286 151.5000 21.42857 1.13389 23.33333 140.0000 23.16667 1.722401
TR 24.42857 171.0000 24.28571 1.25357 23.08333 138.5000 22.83333 1.722401
UK 8.92857 62.5000 8.85714 0.37796 7.25000 43.5000 7.16667 0.408248
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 2:
Kendall’s Coeffi cients of Concordance for Regional Index of Corruption 2010 
and 2013 – Part 2
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Code: accepting bribes (§ 331), bribery (§ 332) 
and indirect bribery (§ 333), abuse of power of 
offi cials (§ 329), obstruction of offi cial duties 
of a person by negligence (§ 330). Given that 
the most risky area is currently regarded to 
be the redistribution of public funds through 
procurement and auction sales, the analysis 
also includes the offences of manipulation of 
public procurement and public tenders (§ 257) 
and actions against public auctions (§ 258).
The following Table 3 shows the results of 
Kendall’s coeffi cient of concordance for the 
RIC of 2010 and the evaluation of the regions 
on the basis of crimes recorded in 2008–2010. 
The value of Kendall’s coeffi cient in all the 
years in question has a value of at least about 
74%, which indicates a statistically signifi cant 
concordance between the assessment of 
the regions based on the RIC in 2010 and 
rated based on police statistics. Verifi cation of 
conformity conclusions of RIC for 2013 and 
statistics of corruption offences recorded in the 
years 2011 to 2013 is shown in Table 4. The 
evaluation of RIC from 2013 coincides with 
police statistics of this period by at least 40%.
Verifi cation of data at the regional level is 
not as clear as with national data; however, 
the assessment of the regions on the basis of 
corruption offences and under the proposed 
Regional Corruption Index (RIC) has also been 
shown to coincide. The observed values of the 
assessed coeffi cients of concordance rank 
the regions based on the evaluation of police 
statistics and the proposed RIC confi rms the 
predicted use of this index as a tool for defi ning 
more and less corrupt areas at the regional 
level.
3.  Quantifying the Degree of 
Corruption in the Regions of the 
Czech Republic
The development of RIC values for 2010 and 
2013 for the regions of the Czech Republic in 
Table 5 show particularly evident signifi cantly 
worse ratings for the regions Severozápad 
and Moravskoslezsko between these periods. 
Conclusions of the RIC may support the 
conclusions of many organisations that deal 
with this issue, such. For example, according 
to the non-profi t organisation Oživení, 
Moravskoslezsko is one of the worst regions 
evaluated, both in terms of transparency of 
public procurement, and in terms of the risk 
of confl ict of interest. According to research 
by the Industry and Transport Association, 
whose aim was to highlight the main issues 
of the business environment, companies and 
business owners consider corruption to be 
serious and a complication to their business 
activities mainly in the Severozápad region [22]. 
Variable
Corruption Crimes 2008 Corruption Crimes 2009 Corruption Crimes 2010
(no. of variables–8 no. of indices-2) (no. of variables–8, no. of indices-2) (no. of variables–8, no. of indices-2)
Avg. value r = 0.73810 Avg. value r = 0.85714 Avg. value r = 0.76190
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Prague 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Severo západ 2.00 5.00 2.00 0.70711 3.00 6.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 0.70711
Střední Čechy 4.00 9.00 4.00 0.70711 4.00 9.00 4.00 0.70711 4.00 8.00 4.00
Jiho východ 2.00 5.00 2.00 0.70711 2.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 7.00 3.00 2.12132
Severo východ 5.00 11.00 5.00 2.12132 5.00 11.00 5.00 2.12132 6.00 13.00 6.00 0.70711
MorSlez 6.00 13.00 6.00 2.12132 5.00 11.00 5.00 0.70711 4.00 8.00 4.00 1.41421
Jiho západ 7.00 15.00 7.00 0.70711 8.00 16.00 8.00 7.00 15.00 7.00 0.70711
Střední 
Morava 6.00 12.00 6.00 6.00 13.00 6.00 0.70711 7.00 14.00 7.00 1.414211
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 3:
Kendall’s Coeffi cients of Concordance for the Regional Index of Corruption 
2010 and corruption crimes in 2008–2010
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Also, the suspension of fi nancial fl ows from 
EU funds to the ROP Severozápad because 
of a suspicion of corruption, which occurred 
in 2011, highlights the increased risk in this 
region. Greater improvements, however, were 
made in the Prague and Jihozápad regions. 
Since 2010, Prague has been one of the two 
regions to establish a regional anti-corruption 
strategy. It also seeks to fi ght against confl ict 
of interest by means of regularly updated 
codes of conduct for councillors and offi cials. 
The Jihomoravsko region is the second region 
in the Czech Republic which created its own 
anti-corruption strategy, in 2011. Also in the 
evaluation of the transparency of public tenders 
of the non-profi t organisation Oživení, the 
Jihovýchod region ranked second to Prague 
and in the assessment of the issue of confl ict of 
interest even overtook Prague and was rated as 
the best region struggling with this issue.
From the assessment of the Czech 
Republic within the RIC in 2010, it is clear that 
the value of the index at the national level is 
considerably worsened by the Prague region. 
Also, the Jihovýchod and Severozápad regions 
reached a value lower than the Czech Republic 
as a whole. These three regions are ranked in 
the overall scale below the national assessment 
and can be expected to impair the national 
assessment of corruption in the Czech Republic 
as a whole. In the RIC evaluation from 2013, the 
Prague cohesion region is still below the national 
values of the RIC, although it has signifi cantly 
improved its score, as has the Severozápad 
region and now the Moravskoslezsko region. 
In the monitored period 2010–2013, these 
regions were identifi ed as regions affected by 
corruption more than other regions in the Czech 
Republic. It can therefore be assumed that the 
reduction of corruption in these regions would 
improve the assessment of the Czech Republic 
as a whole in the context of existing indices at 
the national level of corruption.
Variable
Corruption Crimes 2011 Corruption Crimes 2012 Corruption Crimes 2013
(no. of variables–8 no. of indices-2) (no. of variables–8, no. of indices-2) (no. of variables–8, no. of indices-2)
Avg. value r = 0.40476 Avg. value r = 0.71429 Avg. value r = 0.64286
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Prague 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.41421 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.41421 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.41421
Severo západ 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.41421 1.00 3.00 1.00 0.70711 1.00 3.00 1.00 0.70711
Střední Čechy 3.00 6.00 3.00 1.41421 3.00 7.00 3.00 0.70711 3.00 7.00 3.00 0.70711
Jiho východ 5.00 10.00 5.00 1.41421 5.00 10.00 5.00 1.41421 5.00 10.00 5.00 1.41421
Severo východ 7.00 14.00 7.00 6.00 13.00 6.00 0.70711 6.00 13.00 6.00 0.70711
MorSlez 4.00 8.00 4.00 2.82843 3.00 7.00 3.00 2.12132 3.00 7.00 3.00 2.12132
Jiho západ 6.00 13.00 6.00 2.12132 8.00 16.00 8.00 7.00 15.00 7.00 0.70711
Střední 
Morava 6.00 13.00 6.00 2.12132 6.00 12.00 6.00 1.41421 6.00 13.00 6.00 2.12132
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 4:
Kendall’s Coeffi cients of Concordance for the Regional Index of Corruption 
2013 and corruption crimes in 2011-2013
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Conclusion
In the text of this paper, the Regional Corruption 
Index, RIC, was proposed which, based on 
data from the World Bank and the European 
Commission, allows the level of corruption at 
the level of cohesion regions to be quantifi ed. 
The proposed index uses extensive surveys 
of knowledgeable institutions which deal with 
corruption in the long term and takes into 
account not only regional assessments of 
respondents living in a certain region, but also 
the national assessment of experts. It is an index 
that at present enriches the existing expert 
assessment with the views of the population 
in the cohesion regions, who are the users of 
public goods and services in the region.
With the use of a Regional Corruption 
Index, RIC, the regional level of corruption of 
all Member States of the European Union and 
some candidate countries was also calculated. 
The resulting RIC value demonstrated that 
some European Union countries show a very 
high degree of variability at the regional level 
of corruption. This confi rms the assumption 
that existing indices evaluating the national 
level of corruption can ultimately overestimate 
regions more affected by corruption and vice 
versa underestimate those less corrupt. Among 
the Member States with a very high variability 
of corruption within the cohesion regions are 
Italy, Romania and Bulgaria. Also in the Czech 
Republic, different corrupt activity was confi rmed 
within individual cohesion regions. The region 
most affected by corruption according to the 
RIC of 2010 was the Prague cohesion region; 
according to the evaluation of the RIC of 2013 it 
was the Severozápad region. Both these indices 
showed the region least affected by corruption 
to be the Jihozápad region.
The authors of this paper believe that the 
new methodology for quantifying corruption 
at the sub-national level has the potential for 
broad theoretical and practical applications. 
Besides theoretical, scientifi c-research analysis 
leading to the defi nition of deviations in the 
regional level of corruption from the level of 
corruption at the national level, applying the RIC 
could allow the mutual comparison of individual 
sub-national levels of a country in terms of the 
degree of corruption and become a new tool 
for identifying the variability and intensity of 
corruption in a given area. Practically, it would 
help defi ne problem areas of a given region and 
facilitate direct identifi cation of anti-corruption 
initiatives. In this context, it is interesting that 
according to the last Anti-Corruption Report 
published by the European Commission, the 
Czech Republic, in drawing money from EU 
funds for the period 2007–2013, was rated 
the worst in the entire European Union. One 
of the key problems of drawing resources 
from European funds is particularly corruption. 
European funds so often, paradoxically, do not 
help remove undesirable regional disparities, 
but the distribution of those resources has been 
proven to increase opportunities for corruption, 
which brings additional negative economic 
consequences to the region, which may result 
in disparities within the country increasing [3].
NUTS RIC 2010 NUTS RIC 2013
Czech Republic -0.8554 Czech Republic -0.7947
1 Prague -1.5486 Severozápad -1.2304
2 Jihovýchod -0.9193 MorSlez. -1.1510
3 Severozápad -0.8958 Prague -1.0085
4 Stř. Čechy -0.8588 Stř. Čechy -0.7340
5 MorSlez. -0.7876 Stř. Morava -0.6699
6 Stř. Morava -0.7296 Jihovýchod -0.5734
7 Severovýchod -0.6218 Severovýchod -0.5715
8 Jihozápad -0.4954 Jihozápad -0.5694
Source: Author’s own work
Tab. 5: Regional Index of Corruption for 2010 and 2013 in the regions of the CR
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At the current level of knowledge, the ability 
to quantify the extent of corruption at a sub-
national level fi lls a gap that, within the general 
issue of corruption still exists, both in the Czech 
Republic and worldwide. Exposing corruption 
in today’s globalised environment is becoming 
more complex and it is an issue even for countries 
that generally achieve relatively good results. 
It is therefore necessary to continue charting 
corruption and prevent its further expansion. The 
present article only opens another direction of 
scientifi c research in this fi eld. It can be assumed 
that extending the time scale will allow the 
Regional Corruption Index, RIC, further research 
in this area, especially with regard to the need 
for a practical application of the proposed 
methodology at the level of authentic regions.
This paper was created within the project 
SGSFES Scientifi c Research in Economic 
Policy and Administration. Project registration 
number 2014002.
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Abstract
QUANTIFYING CORRUPTION AT A SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Veronika Linhartová, Jolana Volejníková
Regarding the fact that bribery and other methods of corruption are illegal in most countries, their 
participants try to hide them very carefully and uncovering corruption is often almost impossible. 
Despite that a high number of specifi c procedures exist nowadays. A common feature of these 
methods is however that they focus on the corruption rate at the level of countries. Quantifi cation 
of the corruption rate in smaller regional areas is still a considerably unexplored territory not only 
in the Czech Republic but also all over the world. Also the defi nition of the potential impacts of 
corruption or their precise quantifi cation is an area that was investigated only in general level 
of state. Detailed analysis of corruption still lacks regional dimension. Subnational distinction of 
a territory in terms of the corruption rate could provide a completely new extension of theories of 
reasons and consequences of regional disparities. There are several reasons why to focus on this 
issue. Perhaps the strongest reason is that if corruption is one of the variables that have an effect 
of reducing economic performance, the elimination of corruption in certain regions may be the key 
to the elimination of regional economic disparities and thus increase the economic performance of 
the state.
The main goal of the presented article is formulated in this connection. It consists of a proposal 
of a methodology for quantifying the corruption rate in individual regions of the Czech Republic. 
It will be possible to mutually compare individual regions and at the same time defi ne the rate 
of deviation of a region from “surface” corruption rate in a country. Defi nition of these regional 
disparities in corruption will be a benefi t mainly for anti-corruption policies of a country.
Key Words: Corruption, region, regional disparities, Transparency International, Corruption 
Perception Index.
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